George Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, found himself in an unenviable position at the Lausanne Conference which opened on 20 November 1922. The great victory of 1918 which, as Harold Nicolson boasted, had left 'the Ottoman Empire at our feet dismembered and impotent, its capital and Caliph at the mercy of our guns', and which had allowed the Allies to dictate the Treaty of Sevres, had been dissipated by neglect of the Near East and the Turkish revival under Mustafa Kemâl. Any hopes the British might have had of substituting the victories in the Summer of 1922, whilst the Çanakkale (Chanak) crisis brought Britain to the brink of a new war in September. Although this had been averted by a mixture of good luck, and better sense at Chanak than in London, Curzon had few advantages when he travelled to Svvitzerland to renegotiate the peace settlement with the victorious Turks. He had few troops and, with the exceptions of New Zealand and Newfoundland, the British Dominions made it plain that they would not provide any military support for a new adventure in the Near East. Relations with his French and Italian allies were at a low ebb and the new Prime Minister, Andrew Bonar Law, was anxious to avoid new commitments, particularly in the Near East, both because he had already declared that Britain could not act as the policeman of the wor!d and because he knew that difficulties with the French över reparations in Europe could not be long postponed. Even though the Anglo-French difficulties were not so apparent to the Turks, Curzon was acutely aware of the potential for a breakdown of cooperation either arising from difference över Turkey in the Near East or
1
Curzon did, however, have two important assets-the strength of his own personality, backed by his knovvledge of the region, and the British ability to intercept and read much of the Turkish military and diplomatic signals traffic, the fruits of the modern British intelligence establishment which had been created during and immediately after the First World War. 2 British cryptanalysts from both the armed forces and the newly, established Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS), vvorking on telegrams sent by cable or on intercepted wireless traffic, proved adept in the 1920s at breaking many of the codes of friend and foe alike. Betvveen mid-June 1920 and mid-January 1924 the School issued 12.600 intercepted signals, an average of 290 a month. This intercepted material could normally be made available to British decision-makers within a weck and oftcn sooner. 3 In particular the British wireless listening-post in İstanbul proved an invaluable source of Turkish intercept and the codes employed were easy to read although the information obtained vvas not comprehensive. 4 Nonetheless, Sir Horace Rumbold, Curzon's deputy during the first round of the conference and his replacement during the second, acknovvledgcd the value of this intelligence vvhen he observed that 'the information vve obtained at the psychological moments from secret sources vvas invaluable to us, and put us ^ee Michael Dockrill in the position of a man vvho is playing Bridge and knows the cards in his adversary's hand. 5 The Lausanne Conference thus offers an interesting case study of the advantages and the drawbacks of the use of secret intelligence in an actual negotiation. It was held in two sessions, from 20 November 1922 to 4 February 1923 and then from 23 April until 24 July 1923. its conclusion marked the final phase of the peacemaking process after the First World War, a process which had taken longer than the war itself. Seeing ali the cards in an opponent's hand does not guarantee that one can take ali the tricks particularly when the hand is revealed as a strong one, but Curzon and Rumbold did know when there might be flexibility in the Turkish position and when it would be unwise to press îsmet Pasha, the chief Turkish negotiator, too hard. On several occasions, Rumbold persuaded Curzon to modify his position and to accommodate the Turks because he was convinced by the intercepts that the Turkish freedom of manoeuvre was extremely limited. 6 In May 1923 he wrote to Curzon suggesting that the draft convention on legal arrangements for forcigners in Turkey was not going to succeed: 'I feel that Ismet's hands are tied in this matter by instructions from Angora and you will have seen from the secret sources that if we insist on going beyond the Montagna formula, he is instructed to break off negotiations and leave the Conference. In fact this is the one question on vvhich the Conference my break down...We vvill do our best to get some safeguards for our nationals, but I do not knovv vvhcther our public opinion vvould understand a rupture över this business.' Curzon vvas persuaded to alter his position.
7
There vvere also moments vvhen the British delegates in Lausanne vvere encouraged to stand firm despite a lack of support at home and vvhat appeared to be a dangerous situation in the negotiations. The same sources tended to confirm that Ismet's personal preference was for a more conciliatory policy than that favoured by Ankara. In February 1923 an intelligence report on the 'prospects of peace' gave a brief account of the 'difficult internal situation' in Turkey which had led to the temporary rupture in the negotiations. 'S.I.S. 10 information' about Ismet's attitude, it pointed out, 'has indicated that he has been personally in favour of a moderate policy.' 11 In June Rumbold told Curzon, 'You will have noticed from the usual secret sources that Ismet's position with his own government is becoming more and more difficult.' It was also helpful to know that the Turkish perception of the relationship between the European allies vvas rather different from Curzon's. 'The relations betvveen the French and British are reported good', noted ismet, 'There is little chance of these men foregoing their old confidence in one another.'
13 Curzon was less sanguine, particularly in December 1922 and January 1923. Britain's diplomatic position was not strong. intercepts indicated that France was privatcly offering concessions to the Turks whilst the Soviets were encouraging the Turks to take a hard line and hoping to reach a settlement with the French, who regarded the Near East as less important than their concerns with Germany. 'It is clear to me', declared Rumbold on 16 January 1923, 'that the deeper the French get into the mire of the Ruhr the more keen they are to get out of the Turkish mire.' 14 Added to these difficulties there seemed to be a serious risk of a collapse of the 19 It became clear that the Turks, whilst not prepared to abandon their own vital interests, were anxious to make peace and that they saw their relationship with Great Britain as the central issue at stake. 'If they really want peace, as is clear from ali the secret telegrams,' Leo Emary told Curzon on 2 February 1923, 'it is peace with us they want.' 20 In addition, the Turks were under pressure themselves. Rumbold told Henderson on 30 January, 'We know that the Turks are very vvorried and consider that they have sustained a failure. In any event their personal position is none too rosy for if they return with vvhat the Grand National Assembly will consider a bad treaty they would get dropped on, whereas if they return vvithout having signed anything at ali they will be accused of having wasted nearly three months and much money. So they are going to get it in the neck anyway. I cannot say that I am sorry for them as I have never run up against such a lot of pig-headed, stupid and irritating people in my life." 21 The intercepts should have helped the British to understand the psychological perspectives and aspirations of the new government in Ankara though there is litüe evidence to suggest that this occurred. Kemâl himself
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noted that 'the Entente Powers do not realize that the Ottoman Empire has passed into history and is superseded by a nevv nation and state, determined to obtain their complete independence and sovereignty." 22 Ismet's intercepted report of 23 December 1922 offers a particular insight into the vvay in vvhich he and his colleagues vvished the European povvers to revise the vvay in vvhich they savv, and treated Kemâl's government. The Allies, he observed, 'are extremely tiresome and annoying and by their method of discussion they vvish to covv dovvn the Turk and on the other hand drag him gradually into a quagmire by throvving him into discussions över rotten and insolent demands. in almost every question vve have our backs to the vvall. Either they vvill bring us to our knees and conclude another form of Sevres Treaty or vve vvill bring them to theirs. We are determined to conclude a peace like every other civilized and independent nation.' The Foreign Office reaction vvas sceptical and dismissive, the Turks vvere suffering from 'delusion and fanaticism' against vvhich nothing vvould avail but 'force or fear'. 23 This perhaps represented a lost opportunity, but the British negotiators preferred to rely on vvhat they savv as trusted and successful methods of Eastern diplomacy. As Leo Amery reminded Curzon, There is alvvays a moment in buying a carpet from a Turk vvhen you have to leave the shop. if that moment is rightly judged, you vvill find that before you have got 50 yards the Turk has caught you up and agreed to your price, accompanied by a porter carrying the carpet!' 24 There can thus be little doubt that the information vvhich the British vvere able to extract from their secret sources vvas of great value to them, but number of problems did arise. Although the signals interception operation in istanbul vvas extremely efficient, Curzon could not alvvays rely on receiving the information in good time. This vvas because although some paraphrases of secret intelligence vvere sent directly from istanbul to Lausanne, the intercepts themselves had to go to London, first to the War Office, 25 thence to the Foreign Office and only then vvere they sent to istanbul. On 26 December, for example, Curzon complained that although he vvas avvare of tvvo intercepts of obvious importance, he had not yet seen them. Indeed he only savv them on 28 December, three days after the War Office had received them.
26 General 'Tim' Harington in istanbul apologised, 'I am afraid these secret intercepts take a long time to reach you ovving to the fact that I am not allovved to send them direct.' 27 Colonel Baird, the military attache in istanbul eonfessed to Rumbold, 'I am sorry that we are not allowed to send Ben Jamin's notes direct to Lausanne. Several item of interest to us, but only of real importance and value to Lord Curzon and yourself, and then only if communicated to you at once, have appeared and I have urged their immediate repetition to yo, but apparently the War Office instructions on this point are categoric and our hands are tied. I found on investigation that the two messages from Harington to Troopers [the War Office] to vvhich Lord Curzon in a telegram to the Foreign Office referred some vveeks ago, saying hovv valuable they vvould have been to him, vvere both messages the direct repetition of vvhich vvas forbidden under the above instructions.' 28 Things improved during the second phase of the negotiations and Rumbold did receeive important material directly from istanbul. He vvrote in appreciation to Henderson at the end of the conference: 'Your secret telegrams have been most useful and ali arrived here at the psychological moment, thereby being of immense assistance to us. It is a case admirable liaison vvork betvveen the Constantinople Embassy and this delegation and does you the greatest credit.' 29 Once received the information stili had to be evaluated and assessed. Here judgement and interpretation vvere vital. Faced vvith the same intercepts and other intelligence at the crisis of the first session, Curzon and Rumbold reacted quite differently from Harington and Henderson, vvho advocated an evacuation of istanbul and izmit and the vvithdravval of British forces to the Gelibolu Peninsula. In London the Cabinet vvas set to agree 30 but Curzon objected strongly, 'We have reason to believe that ismet is much perturbed as to situation into vvhich mistaken tactics of his Delegation have forced him, and it may very vvell be that before I leave on Friday night (2 February) the situation change.' Rumbold told Henderson that he, Curzon and Sir Eyre Crovve (the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office) had considered the matter vvith great care and had been 'unanimous in deciding that there could be no question of evacuating Constantinople in present circumstances', adding 'our impression from your...telegrams vvas that Harington and [Admiral] Brock [C in C Mediterranean]had got cold feet.' 31 They had reached this conclusion even before receiving Henderson's telegram of 30 January vvith information 'from a sometimes vvell informed source', that 'after final secret session held yesterday morning Grand National Assembly decided that war must at ali costs be avoided.' ismet 'had been instructed to ask for adjournment rather than rupture of conference and to give undertaking if necessary to refrain from military action of any sort during adjournment' 32 In this case, therefore, the secret intelligence served to confirm a judgement taken on broader grounds and based on political and diplomatic experience.
There was also the problem of how far information discovered from secret sources could be used in negotiations without revealing that these sources existed and thus endangering them in the future. This aspect certainly exercised Curzon, who was incensed by various revelations of what he regarded as French double dealing from intercepted French telegrams and frustrated because he knew he could not confront the culprits with the evidence. 33 Eventually, in 1923, he lost his sense of proportion and taunted the Soviets with extracts of their intercepted and decoded telegrams thus forcing a change of cyphers which it took GCCS some time to break. 34 At Lausanne Rumbold had to be careful not to reveal his knowledge either to the Turks or his colleagues. 'The only matter which worries me at the moment,' he told Curzon on 2 June 1923, 'is the knowledge of Ismet's own position vis-a-vis his Government. I cannot, of course, let my colleagues into my confidence...'
35
Secret intelligence was thus a valuable, if double-edged, vveapon. It even confirmed that the settlement negotiated at Lausanne was the best possible in the circumstances. 'On the whole the treaty has by no means a bad press and the skill and patience of our delegation is fully recognised. There is no reason to suppose that we could have got better terms, judging by Ismet's telegrams from Angora.' 36 its exploitation required sound judgement based on experience and an ability to maximise the available resources, but the information which the British obtained in this way may have helped to bring about a more realistic frame of mind in the policy making elite. As Dockrill and Goold perceptively comment, 'To Lloyd George Kemâl was simply a bandit, and to Curzon ismet was a carpetmonger; there was no thought given to the possibility that they might have limited or legitimate goals.' 37 In such circumstances it can only have helped for the British to be made aware of precisely what the Turks felt to be nonnegotiable and what would be probable sources of crisis if matters were pressed to a breach. If Lausanne became the longest-lasting and most successful of the post-First World War settlements it was because the demands of the main participants were realistic, limited and attainable and secret inteiligence played its part in making at least one of the parties to the negotiations aware of the vital interests of its opponents.
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